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Abstract: ln this paper we develop a microsimulation model for the
business sector. Tlre nrodel is based upon an integrated dataset built at
ISTAT (ltalian lnstitute of Statistics). This dataset combines survey data and
published account data for corporations. The model reproduces the ltalian
tax system on firms (corporate tax, regional tax on economic activity and
social contributions) from the year 1998 onwards. we run the model to
study the effects of the fiscal changes established in recent years by the
Italian government. For this purpose we estimate ex-post irnplicit tax rates
and consider two policy scenarios: the first analyses the impact of the tax
changes approved in the period 1998-2001, while the second scenario
analyses the effects of the tax reform recently introduced by the
government. Simulation output includes tax due for every firm both in the
baseline scenario and under the reformed regime as well as estimates of
effective tax rates disaggregated by sectors, size and other characteristics.
Zusammenfassung: Das Manuskript beschreibt ein Modell fiir Mikro-
Simulationen im Unternehmensbereich. Die Datenbasis der Simulationen ist
ein integriefier Datenbestand, der am ISTAT erstellt wurde und in dem
Daten aus statistischen Erhebungen und verÒffentlichte Unternehmensdaten
von Kapitalgesellschaften zusammengefiihrt sind. Das Simulationsrnodell
stellt die seit 1998 gùltige Besteuerung (Steuern auf Kapitalgesellschaften,
regionale unternehmenssteuer, sozialabgaben) von italienischen
Untemehmen dar. Wir verwenden das Modell, um Auswirkungen der
Anderungen im Steuersystem zu untersuchen, die in den letzten Jahren
vorgenommen wurden. Dazu schàtzen wir implizite Steuersàtze auf Basis
zweier Szenarios: Das erste analysiert die Effekte der Anderungen, die
zwischen 1998 und 2001 wirksam wurden, das zweite die in jùngster Zeit
vorgenommene Steuer-Reform. Die Ergebnisse der Simulationen urnfassen
die von den Unternehmen sowohl im ursprtinglichen Szenario als auch nach
der Steuer-Reform zù bezahlenden Steuern sowie Schàtzungen der
effektiven Steuerszitze fìir einzelne Sektoren, fiir unterschiedliche
unternehmensgrÒBen und disaggregiert nach anderen charakteristika.
Keywords: microsimulation, business taxes, social contributions.
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Introduction
This paper presents a microsimulation model for enterprises to perform sirnulations of
the iàpact that different fiscal policies have on firms.l Tax policy analysis and tax
revenue forecasting can be carried out by using eitl-rer macro or micro models. Macro
models are typically based on tlre use of aggregate data. Tlrerefore, simulations of fiscal
policy ehanges and revenue forecasting are usually obtained by niodelling economic
relationships among different institutional sectors as well as their belravioural responses"
Microsimulation models (MM), on the other hand, are usually accounting models based
on the use of large datasets of disaggregated data, such as household budget (or
consumption) surveys and firm surveys. These models estimate tax liabilities of
individual units (households or firms) and their microeconomic results can be
aggregated to the macro level to produce estimates of the tax revenue for the economy.
Obviously, the availability of disaggregated data marks the possibility of building a
MM. ln fact, as households survey data has become more and more accessible,
households MM have been developed and are in use in many countries to study the
effects of existing tax legislation ancl fiscal policy reforms.' O,, the other hand,
microsimulation models for firms are less widespread or well known. The rnain reason
is that enterprise microdata are still quite difficult to access. Moreover, each survey is
shaped by a specific purpose and collected information is much segmented. Therefore,
most economic models rely upon macro and meso 
- 
sectoral and territorial 
- 
data.
Finally, as some MM for firms have been built at the national level they are usually
limited to corporations both because of data availability and of the relevance of these
companies in the European framework.3
This paper aims at making an original contribution in presenting a microsimulation
model for the Italian firms to analyze the effects of the recent fiscal reforms. This
analysis is very innovative as far as very small enterprises are concemed due to the fact
that scarcity of data had previously hampered empirical work in this field. The
I This model was developed by the authors of this paper as part of the DIECOFIS (Development of a
Systelr-r of lndicators on Cornpetitiveness and Fiscal Impact on Enterprise Perfonnance) project financed
by the InJbrmation Societ.v Technologies Programnte (lST-2000-3 I125) of the European Cormnission.
The IRAP and social security contribution modules were built by Rossella Bardazzi and Maria Grazia
Pazienza, the corporate tax module by Valentino Parisi. The anthors are grateful to Manuela Coronraldi
and Mariangela Zoli for their contribution to the construction of the corporate tax module, and to
Giuliana Zito for her valuable help on the n'ricrosimulation model. Thanks are due to participants at the
Conference Public Finance and Financial Markets, 59'h International Instittie o./' Pubtic Finance
Congress, which took place in Prague in August 2003, where part of the empirical results discussed in
this paper were presented, and to participants at the International Workshop on Dqta Integration and
Record Matching in Vienna, November 13114,2003. The model was run at the ltalian National Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT) where data are produced. The authors are grateful to Filippo Oropallo who gave up
his scarce tin.re to contribute to this work. ISTAT bears no responsibility for analysis or interpretation of
the data. The usual disclaimer applies.
2 In the last decade, the literature on microsir.nulation rnodels has become quite extensive. There are,
among others, sorne book length reviews such as Harding ( I 996), Gupta and Kapur (2000), Mitton,
Sutherland and Weeks (2000), Creedy (ed.) (2002). Sonre relevant articles are Merz (1991), Merz (1993),
Merz(1994), Creedy (2001 ) and Sutherland ( I 995).I For a short description of some existing corporate MM see Ahrned et ol. (2003).
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development of a microsimulation prototype for tlre business sector presented here ts an
important step, in particular for its potential to show the impact that fiscal policy lras on
company choices concerning financial policy, localization, investments and input
allocation. This microsimulation model is based upon an integrated dataset built at
ISTAT combining sllrvey data and published balance sheets for corporations. Data
quality in terms of population representatior-r has proven to be very high. The model
simulates: the corporation income tax 
- 
IRPEG is the ltalian acronym 
-, the social
security contributior-rs paid by employers, and the regional tax on economic activity
(acronym IRAP). As any economic model at its early stage of development, the
microsimulation model presented here has sorne limits. Firstly, the model is static
because the dataset available at present is just one cross-section for the year 1998. Then
it does not include yet firms' behavioural responses considering only the first-round
impact of tax policies without investigating second-round effects. Future developnrents
of the MM will be aimed at removing both these limitations.
The paper is organized as follows. ln section 2 the dataset and the structure of the model
are presented along with a brief description of the specific tax modules and the main
methodologieal aspects concerning the model construction. Then, the two scenarios
considered in the simulation analysis are described (section 3). Specifically, a different
legislation for modelled taxes is applied on the 1998 data in order to reproduce the base-
case scenario. Next, the reformed scenario is simulated to evaluate the effects of the tax
reform proposed by the current ltalian govemment for 2004. Simulation output includes
revenue estimates in both scenarios by different firms categories: geographical area,
activity sectors and size. Section 4 is devoted to a more detailed investigation of the
reform impact on medium and large firms. For this purpose we estimate ex-post intplicil
tax rates (EPITR), computed as the ratio between taxes actually paid and a reference
economic aggregate (tum-over). The final section summarizes our main empirical
findings.
2 The model
2.1 Building the specific dataset
The model is based on a dataset called "Regional Tax and Social Security" (RTSS).4
Two ISTAT (ltalian Institute of Statistics) surveys are combined in the RTSS: the Small
and Medium Sized Enterprises survey (PMI) carried out on private firms with less than
4 The dataset is fully described in a paper of this joumal written by Oropallo and Inglese. Here we jtrst
remind the key features of the microdata.
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100 workers and tlre survey on Large Enterprises (SCI) with more than 99 employees.s
Atpresent, the base yearof these data is 1998."' The reference unit of the dataset is the
enterprise defined as "the organisation of an economic activity conducted in a
professional manner with the intent of producing market goods or providing market
services" Tlre enterprise can either be of a single-location type or of the multi-location
typ"."' In tliis work, we will refer to this definition when using both 'finn' and
'enterprise'.
These survey data are not completely adequate to build a nrodel for the main taxes paid
by firrns. ln fact, sorne computations cannot be performed using the data (in that they
are too aggregate to do so)8 and therefore additional data sources are used. ln particular,
although the survey data covers the company balance sheet in some detail, we need to
match information from our dataset against published accounts in which some variables
are recorded at a rnore disaggregated level. Therefore, for a selection of firms in the
RTSS dataset the survey data are integrated with balance sheets data. This integrated
dataset is specifically well suited for simulating corporate tax rules. ISTAT has a
statistical business register which files all active enterprises (acronym ASIA). In Table
1, a comparison between the model dataset and the population in the ASIA archive for
firms of different legal status is presented. These figures show that tlie ciataset is very
good in terms of representativeness of the population of enterprises by legal status
included in the business register.
5 The acronyms PMI and SCI stand respectively for the Italian "Piccole e Medie Imprese" (Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises, SME) and "sistenra dei Conti delle Imprese" (Large Enterprises, LE)"
Exhagstive information is available for large enterprises that have at least 100 workers, while for small
and medi1rm sized finns data are collected from a sarnple of enterprises. Frotn the poptrlation of SMEs
(inclLrding firms with no employees) a theoretical stratified sample is selected accounting for roughly 30À
of the population. Then, the methodology for the inference about the population is based on bounded
weighting estimators.
6 The surveys are carried out every year, thus new datasets for 1999 and 2000 shotrld soon become
available. However, the SME sarnple changes over time thus a time-series of cross-sectional data will be
built, while for large enterprises the dataset will become a panel.
' Th" ,,.,rr"y data are collected in fulfilment of the European legislation on "stmctural Business
Statistics" regulated by Council Regulation n"58191 . For details on national methodologies to collect these
data see Eurostat (2001).
8 Mo.. details on the specific use of additional data sources can be found in paragraph 2.3 where the tax
modules are described. However, some examples may be cited: some personnel cost conlponents for large
enterprises are joined in one single variable and mnst be divided to compllte wages and salaries as tax
base for social contributions; some components of the corporate tax base must be detailed to con.rpute the
tax yield; data on ernployees by type of contract are too aggregate as far as special contracts are
concemed 
- 
short term contracts, apprentices, work training contracts -- and additional sources are used
to detail this statistical information.
R" Bardazzi, V. Parisi, M. C" Pazienza
Table l: Comparison between the model dataset and the population: breakdown by legal
status of non-financial and non- agricultural firms - 1998
Nurnber of firms
in thc datase t Y'i, Model Dataset
741
7o in Asia archive
Solc Entrcprcncurships
Partnerships
Corporalions
Co-o perative.s a n d ot hers
2.607.031
854.89'1
42t_262
46.925
66,3
21,8
10,7
1,2
66,7
20,1
I 1.6
1,6
Total 3.930.1 r 5 100,0 100,0
Sou r c e'. Authors' estimates
From the following figure, we observe that in terms of output, the SMEs 
- 
enterprises
with less than 100 employees 
- 
produce 620À of the total. We also see that 25o/o of
workers are employed in large enterprises (LE), in spite of these representing only 0.2Yo
of total enterprises.
60% 80% 100%
Source.' Denk, Oropallo (2002).
Figure 1: Some characteristics of the population of Italian Enterprises
(RTSS dataset), 1998
The dataset covers almost all sectors of economic activity (NACE classificatìon):
Mining (C); Manufacturing (D); Energy (E); Constructions (F); Trade (G); Hotels (H);
Communications (I); Other services (K); Education (M); Health (N) and other social
services (O except division 9l)" The dataset excludes Agriculture and Fishing (AB) and
Financial Services (J).
4Oo/"
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2.2 The model structure
ln general, there are some basic reasons for using a microsimulation model in fiscal
policy analysis.e The first reason draws on the clear possibility of having a more refined
outcome than one would achieve if aggregated data were used. Through individual
observations and large datasets, any policy can be ar-ralysed in great detail for every finn
by considering the individual budget items of each. Aggregating data could cause a loss
of details. This aspect is particularly important if one considers that contradictory results
may derive from using eitlrer aggregated or disaggregated data. For example,
aggregating a budget item with positive and negative values may lead to a wrong
interpretation of the effect of a specific tax policy. As a consequence, aggregated results
can be gained by disaggregated data, whereas the reverse is not true. The analysis of the
impacts of a specific policy on some variables 
- 
such as the number of taxpayers with
negative tax base 
- 
can only be perforrned in a meaningful way on the basis of
microdata. Then a microsimulation model makes it easier to standardise the analysis
over time. The dynamic effect of a given tax policy may therefore be analysed in a
consistent way. Furtherrnore, statistical properties of large samples tend to generate
results with lower standard errors and, under certain hypothesis about the distribution of
the variables, confidence interval of results may also be calculated.
The microsimulation model used in this paper is at its early stage of development.
As the dataset available at present is just one cross-section, the model is static. In the
simulation scenarios presented here, we consider only the direct impact of policy
changes not including firms' behavioural responses. The basic structure of the model is
p..rÀt.d in the foltowing chart (Figure 2).r0 Firstly, a procedure to check and
substitute missing values is undertaken and a preliminary consistency check is
performed.ll Subsequently, the social contributions are modelled and their revenue is
estimated. As a third step, the IRAP tax base is computed and the tax yield is estirnated
as some labour deductions from the IRAP base are calculated in the SC module. Finally,
the IRPEG module is run to estimate the corporate tax on a selection of the overall
dataset .
Logically, some important interactions are implemented in the model. For example,
some deductible labour costs for IRAP are computed in the social contributions module
and are therefore endogenous to the model. Moreover, social contributions are, as a
component of labour cost, deductible from the corporation tax base. With all modules
'These considerations are drawn frorn Bardazzi, Gastaldi and Pazienza (2002\.
r') The model consists of a set of STATA programs which can be executed either in separate steps or with
a compact procedure.ll With this procedure we check the internal consistency of the accounts collected in the n.ricrodata.
Although rnost of the variables are collected both for small and large enterprises, some data are found in
only one survey and are missing from the other. Moreover, tax rules sir-rrulation may require the use of
somc variables of the econonric accounts which are neither subtotals nor balancing iterns but sirnply
components of a side of the accounts. In this case, we need to preserve both disaggregated inforrnation
and accounting consistency when the irnpact of some fiscal reforms or some minor changes in the tax
rules are simulated. A rnicrosinrulation model is indeed the most adequate tool to give a comprehensive
picture of this matter provided that nricrodata are available and reliable at a disaggregated level.
Therefore, the checking procedure rnust be acculate and our dataset has been continuottsly revised to
eliminate eventual intenral inconsistencies.
R. Bardazzi, V" Parisi, M. G. Pazienza 243
workirig together, an interaction between labour cost policy (specifically a change irr
social security coritribution rates) and IRPEG due from a firm can be estimated.
Prcliminary Proccdurc
- checking accounti ng coltsistency
and statistical discrepancies
+
Social Contributions (SC) modulc
- cornputing the SC base
- computing the SC revenue
Corporate Tax module
- sin.rulating tìscal adjustments of
(some) balance sheet variables
- simulating taxable income, gross
corporate tax, dividend tax credit,
tax relief, corporate tax due
SurauleuoN
Rpsulrs
- Social Security
Data (II" z\, matrices)
- SC ratcs (l- rnatrix)
- Fiscal and Social SecuritY
Data (Il, A, Y matrices)
- IRAP Rates (l matrix)
+
IRAP module
- converting some survey data to tiscal
variables
- computing tax deductions
- computing gross and net tax bases
- computing the tax revenue
Parameters (tax
legislation)
Corrective
parameters
Figure 2:The Model Strucfure
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2.3 Taxes and Social Contributions Modules
Social Contributions. At present, our analysis refers to social contributions paid by
employersl2 for hired workers classified in our dataset as executives, white-collar
workers, manual wot*ers and apprentices. For these categories, it is possible, despite
sorne difficulties, to reconstruct the tax base usirig the data available in tlre dataset witlr
some additional information and assumptions, as described below. The rules for social
contributions are fairly complex with specific rates for each sector of activity, firm size,
type of contract and contribution. Given the large number of social contribution types
considered, for the purpose of readability the contributions have been aggregated intofour groups:
' IVS - old-age, survivors pension sclreme (IVS- INPS and INPDAI contributions);
" Miscellaneous (sickness, maternity, family benefits, ordinary unemployment
benefit);
' CIG part time unemployment: ordinary earnings complement (CIGO - Cassa
integraziotte guadagni ordinaria) and extraordinary earnings complement (CIGS-
Cassa integrazione guadagni straordinaria);
' 
INAIL employment injuries and occupational diseases (INAIL contributions).
The main rationale of this module has been that of designing a flexible procedure in
order to implement the t 998 rules in detail and, at Àe same time, io make the
introduction of changes for the followillg years quite straightfor-ward. As an example,
data on wages and salaries by worker categories are too aggregate and therefore are not
very suitable to compute the contribution tax base: the INPS sòr..e'3 was used for data
on averoge wages and salaries by sector of activity to estimate the total earnings by firmfor executives, white-collar workers, manual workers and apprentices. Data o*r, ur*.ug.
wages by type of worker (fr) and by activity (7) are.stored in matrix A and multiplied Èy
the number of,employed persons in each firm (i).la The SC due for employers for each
i-th firm and for each type of employee (ir) is computed as:
SC,i,,r = [Workers rir, x A r* ], f l,,
where m denotes several types of social contributions and I is a matrix with
contribution rates for each contribution type by activity (7).15 Finally, total employers,
(l )
r2 The social contributions (SC) borne by ltalian employees and employers differ in their functions and
scope" Workers with special contracts 
- 
such as apprenticeship and wàrk-training contracts 
- 
pay different
social contributions from full time workers. Our aim is to rnodel the effects of all contributionsdistinguished by type, rate, type of contract, firrn size, actìvity sector and so on. For a ,ore detaileddescription of the social Contributions rnodule, see Bardazzi anàpazienza(20O3).l3 IstitLrto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale (National Institute for Social Security).la The value of k is 4 in relation to the categories of workers considered in the model (executives, white-
collar workers, nranual workers and apprentices). The vah-re of j is 57, referring ro rh. N,lòa 2 digits
categories excluding Agriculture and Fishing, as well as Financial services.
'-' ContribLrtion rates by types of worker (k) are stored in different matrices f which are filled in outside
the program and therefore rnay be easily updated.
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social cor-rtributiorìs are computed for every firml6 as total sum of each type of
contribution for each type of worker.
The model's fit can be considered very satisfactory in terms of total contribution
receipts for the base year (1998). On average, the SC n-rodule overestimates the
contribution receipts by 4 per cent.
Regional Tax on Economic Activity (IRAP). Basically, we can describe the IRAP
gross tax base as the value added of the finn, net of depreciations:
Gross Tax Base:Valtte oJ'Production 
- 
Ptn'chq.ses of'Goods and Services 
- 
Deprecioliotts (2)
These values can be found in the firm's balance sheet and are collected in the RTSS
database, but a major problem is the reconciliation of balance-sheet values with fiscal
values. This means that the model must reproduce the changes that the Tax Authority
regulations require for some items on the balance sheet. ln particular, we transform the
accounting values into fiscal values using Tax Authority data for retums submitted in
1999 (Ministero delle Finanze,2002a, concerning income for 1998) which provide the
basic information needed in order to create a reconciliaticn module between balance
sheet and fiscal values.
This procedure uses specific coefficientS 1/r'1., calculated from Tax Authority data on a
sectoral (7) and dimensional basis (t), applied to the survey data to estimate the fiscal
values for each firm i.l7
Fiscal Values ,,r = Stu've! data ,,r xll ,1 (3)
The gross tax base is computed according to dehnition(2), but every item is convefted
on a fiscal basis. In order to obtain the net tax base, there are some labour cost
components that firms can deduct.'t Thus, the tax due by each firm is given by:
IRAPI : Net TAx Base , xl,,
Where matrix I contains specific tax rates with regional and sectoral details for
every year. This feature allows for a flexible revision of the model for the regional
autonomy of manoeuvring tax rates applied from 2000 onwards.le
i6 IRAP is a tax on the cornpany value added net of amortizations and depreciations, with the exclusion
therefore of deductibility of interest incurred and the cost of labour. This tax was introduced in the Italian
system in 1998 and was meant to become the focus of regional tax autonomy. The decentralized
institutions have the possibility of manoeuvring the tax rates, albeit within quite restrictive limits, without
any power to affect the setting of the tax bases. The IRAP module is fully described in Bardazzi, Gastaldi
and Pazienza (2002).
17 The value of j is 57, that is the NACE 2 digits categories excluding Agriculture and Fishing, and
Financial Services. As for k ({irm din-rension categories) we consider 6 income classes.
l8 Deductible labour costs are: expenses for employment injuries insurance (INAIL social contribLrtions);
total labour cost of apprentices, work training contracts and disabled (from 2001); a specific allowance for
social and labour co-operatives. In 1998, total labour cost deductions reached l3 million Euros.
(4)
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Lastly, it is worthwhile to recall that, from the perspective of product distribution, the
incidence of IRAP is on the value added components, such as labour costs, interest
expenses and profits. For the purpose ofecononrìc analysis, one can define the tax base
as an alternative of definition (2):
Gross Tox Bose (alternative): Labour cosls * interest expenses + pro./ìt (5)
The response in terms of govemment
underestimates IRAP revenue by 0.2 per
entrepreneurships and partnerships, while
status, a larger difference is found."
revenue is very satisfactory: the model
cent and has a good fit fbr corporations,
for co-operatives and firms of other legal
The Corporate Tax (IRPEG). The Corporate Tax Module (CTM hereinafter) is built
following a modular structure. The order in which tl-re sub-modules are implemented in
the model is logically a reflection of the structure of the corporation tax rules. The main
building blocks of the CTM are the Fiscal Adjustment, Corporate Income, and
Corporate Tax routines which run sequentially. Each module uses other programs
basically to simulate tax instruments used in the main routines which-represent specific
provisions allowed or provided by the tax legislation (the DIT system2t , tax allowances,
losses from the previous periods than can be carried forward, tax credits, tax reliefs and
so on). The corporate tax base is obtained from the profit (loss) resulting from the
company balance sheet adjusted for tax purposes. Fiscal adjustments of balance sheet
variables that cannot be modelled are entered using parameters calculated on the basis
of corporate tax returns published by the Tax Authoiiiy, as in the IRAP cas" ."
re lt's worthwhile to stress that in the RTSS dataset the regional distribution of employment and labour
cost is included for every multilocated firm. Thanks to this feature a reliable regional tax base has been
built.
'" Mor.over, we wish to highlight that the model is adequate also with regard to the distribution of
taxpayers between a positive and negative tax base.
2r The Dual Income Tax (DIT) system was introduced in 1998 for the general purpose of reducing both
the discrimination against equity finance and the company tax rate. In this system profits are divided in
two components: the first component represents the ordinary income or normal profits, that is, the
opportunity cost of new financing with equity capital compared to other forms of capital investments; the
residual component is the extra-profit. Ordinary incorne is calculated by applying an assigned norninal
rate of capital return to the annual capital increases evaluated with reference to the value of capital stock
at the date 31109196. The nominal rate is set yearly by the govemment. Ordinary profits are taxed at the
preferential rate of 19% while remaining profìts, the second component of corporate ìncome, are taxed at
the ordinary rate. Forrnally, the total corporate tax anrount (Tg) can be expressed as follows:
Tc : t (n - rAKe6) + t' rAKsr,
where fI represents total taxable profits, r is the irnputed nominal rate, t the ordinary corporate tax rate, t'
the prelerential tax rate (19%), and AKe6 net capital increases evaluated with reference to 1996, as
explained above. Tlrerefore, under the DIT system, the "effective" stattttory rate ranges between t and t',
depending on the amount olprofits eligible for the benefit (AKe6).
2? Althor.rgh for the large enterprises dataset on whìch the corporate tax tnodttle is nrn there are no
available fiscal data that can be used to validate rnodelled tax yield, a prelirninary analysis shows that the
model overestimates corporate tax revenue and that this result is consistent with overestinration of profits
for firms of the dataset. For a more detailed description of the corporate tax module and estimated resr-rlts
see Parisi (2003)"
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3 A policy simulation
In tliis sectiori we discuss the effects of tlre main changes introduced and planned in the
1998-2004 period. For this purpose, we divide the whole period into two sub-periods
and we consider two different scenarios, the legislation in force ìn tlre year 2001 and the
new fiscal reform that is in force since January 2004 (the so called Tremonti reform,
after the name of the Minister who introduced it). The first scenario basically considers
the policy changes brought in by the previous government before the new one came into
effect (2001), while the second scenario (hereafter Reform Scenario) considers the
reform recently approved by the current government. Results of the simulations are first
presented for the whole dataset mainly in terms of tax revenue changes, eventually
distinguished by enterprise legal stalus and localisation. Finally, the effects of these
reforms on the firms' tax burden are considered for medium and large sized enterprises.
It is worthwhile to stress that all scenarios' results are hypothetical in the sense that are
based on the 1998 base year dataset under tlre assumption of different tax regimes.
3.1 The 2001 Scenario
For the 2001 scenario, the new provisions and rules conceming IRAP, social
contributions and the corporation tax are implemented on the 1998 base year dataset.
Regarding IRAP, since the year 2000, regions are allowed to change the tax rates and to
introduce allowances and exemptions for specific sectors of activity. During the same
period, some social contribution rates have changed as a consequence of a nominal
adjustment (as for apprenticeships) or as a double dividend effect of the Carbon Tax
introduced in 1999 (a reduction of some SC rates was financed through the new green
tax). Moreover, in the Finance Law for 2001 the previous government introduced two
changes aimed at rnitigating the labour cost as a component of the IRAP tax base; a full
deduction of persorurel costs for employed disabled people is allowed as well as a
specific deduction for small enterprises linked to the tax base (only firms with IRAP
taxable income no greater than 181.000 Euros are eligible to this deduction).23
The implementation of the 2001 legislation on the 1998 dataset gives a revenue
effect of -765 million Euros for IRAP, mainly concentrated on very small firms, sole
entrepreneurs and partnerships which show a reduction in the tax due, on average, of
l7,8yo and 6,7Yo compared to 1998. It is worthwhile to note, however, that the new
deduction linked to the tax base represents 95oÀ of the revenue difference and benefits
92oÀ of firms. Firms with a negative tax base (4,040 in 1998) rise to 15,8o/o in 2001.
Over 80% of these firms are sole entrepreneurs, and more than 25oÀ of Southem firms
7ì
-- According to law n.68/99, fimrs are obliged to ernploy disabled people in relation to their size:
. frorn 15 to 35 workers: I disabled person;
. from 36 to 50 workers:2 disabled persons;
. rnore than 50 workers: 7%o of total workers rnust be disabled.
However, according to an unofficial and qualitative appraisal of the situation, flrms show a very low
compliance with the law. As no statistical information on this matter can be found in the dataset, we
assurìe that disabled people are ernployed in firms as manual workers for 50% of the law requirements.
248 Austrian Joumal of Statistics,Vol. 33 (2004), Number l+2,237-259
have, after the new deductions, a negative tax base. The IRAP revenue reduction by
firm localisation is shown in Figure 3.
Sotrrce'. Authors' estimates
Legenda: North West:Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, Lourbatdia,
Piernonte; Nord East:Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia
Giulia, Veneto, Ernilia Rornagna; Centre: Toscana, Umbria,
Lazio, Marche; South: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia,
Basrlicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
Figure 3: IRAP: Revenue differences 2001-1998 by localisation of firms
Concerning the corporation tax, in the 2001 scenario the structure of the DIT
allowance corresponds to its last version before this system was practically abolished by
the new goven'ìment. Specifically, in 2001, some changes were introduced in order to
speed up the DIT system. We also call to mind that in 2001 the statutory corporate tax
rate is reduced from 370À to 360/o. Therefore, under the dual rate system the "effective"
corporate statutory rate ranges between the preferential rate (19%) and the statutory rate
(36%),depending on the amount of profits eligible for the allowance.
As for the corporate tax system, we estimate the "effective" statutory tax rates for firms
of each activiiy sector due to the DIT system.2a Suclr estimates are obtained from the
base year dataset using external information (aggregated data from Centrale dei Bilanci,
2a Basically, as conrpared to the first version of the DIT systeln described in footnote 2Ì, according to
these changes allowable profits are increased by 40% by applying a multiplier ( 1,4) to their amount when
cornptrting the tax due. Seemingly, the idea behind these changes was to extend the DIT system from the
incremental regime, where allowable profits are computed on the basis of capital (retained earnings and
subscriptions) increases, to a final regirne where such profits are calculated on the basis of the entire
company capital stock. Although the DIT system was completely abolished in January 2004, in June
2001 the new government introduced modifications to the DIT allowance mechanistn basically aimed at
lessening the effects of this system" In the simulation we do not consider the effects of these (temporary)
modifications.
-t0.0 -8.0 -6,0 -4.0 -2,0 0,0
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2OOZ) on equity capital clranges.2-t Tlre results show that, in 2001, the estimated rnean
"effective" statutory corporate tax rate is 33,1olo, about 3 percentage points lower than
the statutory corporate rate of taxation set by the legislation (36%). The DIT allowance
favours, in particular, enterprises in the 'electrical, energy, gas, steam, and water' sector
and in tlre 'transport and comrnunication' sector, which exlribit "effective" statutory
rates respectively of about 6 and 4 percentage poirits lower than the n-ìean rate (Figure
4). On the contrary, fìrms in tl-re 'educational services' sector do not seem to benefit a
great deal fiom the dual rate system.26
Electrical energy, gas, stealr, water
Transport, storagc, conlmtttrication serviccs
Constnrction
Manulàcturing, mining
Mean
Wholesale and retail trade services
l.lcalth and social services
Otìrcr community, social and personal services
Hotel and restaurant services
Real estate, renting and business services
Education services
0510152025303540
"Ef1èctive" statutory corporate tax rates (7o)
S ou rc e'. Authors' estimates
Figure 4: "Effective" statutory corporate tax rates (%)bV activity sector (NACE letter
classification); 2001 Scenario
2-t To fully esrimate the effects of the DIT system, ideally, the 2001 scenario simulation should be mn
using data updated to the same year. This is generally tnte for all sirnulations referring to tax legislation of
different years where balance sheets of the same years are to be used. The other possibility could be to
update balance sheet variables. This procedure however would inevitably be imprecise and would present
strong biases. Therefore, as already explained in this paper, analyses are performed using 1998 balance
sheets in all scenarios. However, the updating issue is particularly relevant regarding the DIT system
given that using 1998 balance sheet variables would underestinrate allowable DtT profits, while we
expect the amount of allowableprofits tobe potentially higher dr-re to greatercapital increases undertaken
by the companies r-rp to the year 2001. Therefore, in computing the "effective" statutory rates we update
all variables relevant to simulate the DIT allowance, as well as gross company profìts, to year 2001. This
procedure rìses parameters computed lrom the Centrale dei Bilanci (2002) which reports company
accounts for various years. "Effective" statutory rates are calculated using profits as denominator.
2t' It is noteworthy that, accolding to orlr estimations, benefits of the DIT system are higher for large
enterprises (with more than 250 ernployees), that display "effective" statutory rates ranging from 0,5 to
about I percentage point lower than the average rate, and 4 percentage points lower than the statutory
rate.
ò
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3.2 The tax reform scenario
At the end of 2001, the ltalian Govemment approved a Bill containing guidelines for a
comprehensive tax reform affecting botli direct and indirect taxation. The Italian
Parliament subsequently delegated2T the Italian Government to implement a tax refornr
in compliance with the principles set out in the-Enabling Law and a first step of tlre
reform came into force ai the beginning of 2004'28
The new tax system will be structured around five types of taxes (personal income tax,
corporate income tax, VAT, tax on services and excise duties) all of which are governed
by a consolidated tax code. The main characteristics of the new system for firms are:
o the abolition of the DIT system and, gradually, of IRAP;
. a general tax exemption of corporate dividends and distributed capital gair-rs and
the abolition of tlre dividend tax credit and other measures regarding the tax
treatment of capital gains and losses;
o tlie introduction of an optional consolidated tax return for groups that can be
extended to foreign subsidiaries.
The reform provides for the abolition of the dual rate system and sets a uniform
corporate tax rate of 33o/o. One of the most important innovations is the introduction of a
consolidated tax regime for ltalian corporate groups. The second important innovation is
the introduction of a participation exemption regime under which inter-corporate capitll
gains are exempted from taxation, and which piovides for the exemption of dividendsze
utong with the ubolition of the full imputation dividend tax relief.30
Currently, ltaly does not have any thin capitalisation regulations. In the new systern, a
debt-equity ratio is introduced in order to prevent thin capitalisation of companies.
When financial debts (such as loans, money deposits, etc.) granted or secured by the
sl'rareholders owning at least a l0oA stake in the company and by related companies
exceed this threshold, interest costs are classed as paid dividends and cannot be
deducted from the tax base.
As previously mentioned, under the new framework IRAP will be completely
eliminated. However, as this tax still represents the basic financial source for the
Regions and the National Health System, its abolition will be gradual. Article 8 of the
Enabling Law provides that priority will be given to abolishing the non-deductibility of
" La* April 7, 2003 (Enabling Law).28 Legislative Decree December 2003 n.344.
2e Specifically, dividends paid by the company (either resident or non-resident) to its shareholders are
excluded fron-r the corporate tax base to the extent of 95%" of their amount, while, when dealing in a
consolidate{ fiscal unity, a 100% exemption is granted. Along the same lines, capital losses are not
deductible for tax purposes if the requirements cited above are met.
3t' The general reason underlying these mles, that do not apply to unincorporated enterprises for which
dividends and capital gains rnust be partially included in the tax base, relates to avoiding double taxation
of inter-corporatè incònre (both capltal gains as well as dividends) and, concerning dividend taxation,
relates to international issues such as the irnputation system's tendency to favour dornestic taxpayers over
non-residents (Giannini, 2003, Keen, 2002).
2sl
personnel costs and, as an example, suggests that 20 per cent of personnel costs be
deductible frorn the IRAP tax base.
Before the Enablilg Law was passed, the 2003 Finance Law introduced some changes
with the general aiÀ of reducing the share of labour costs on tlre total tax base-31
In the Refbrm scenario, as regards IRAP we simulate tl-re effects of: i) the specific
deductiop fòr small firms and the deduction aimed at lessening the labour cost tax
wedge, both introduced with the Finance Law for 2003; ii) the general reduction of
2OoA of labour cost frorn the tax base, as a possible path towards the IRAP abolition
proposed by the Enabling Law" The estimated revenue eflect of these changes is -2,5
Littion Euros (80% of which comes from the 20% reduction of IRAP tax base), wìth an
impact scattered among firrns, since this general reduc.tion does not discriminate by size
but is specifically linked to personnel costs (Table 2)."
Table 2: IRAP: revenue and loss position by firm size in the
Reform and 2001 scenarios (*)
Entplollssg
Clttsses
Revenue
Difference
Reform-2001
(thousand ofEuros)
Revenue
Differences
Reform- 2001
(%)
(%)
Companies that pay
NO IRAP
(negative tax base)
2001 Scenario
(%)
Companies that paY
NO IRAP
(negative tax base)
Refonn Scenario
Companies that pay
NO IRAP
(absol Lrte di fference)
Reform-2001
0to49
50 to 250
Above 250
-1.357,351
-446.631
-'780.841
- 18,00
- 18,41
- 19,40
r 5,88
0,17
0.95
23,7 4
1,69
1,54
307.609
r63
t5
-2.s84.828 -18,4'7 r 5,8 ?1 67 301.781Total
(*) 2001
Source'.
and Relòrrn scenarios are simulated on the
Authors' estimates
I99B base year dalaset
Regarding the corporation tax, we simulate3s the impact of: i) the abolition of the DIT
allòwancà and the introduction of a uniform tax rate system v/ith a rate of 33%, ii) the
exemption of capital gains on shares (owned for at least one year and recorded as long
term àssets) in other corporations carrying out a commercial activity (and not-residing
in tax haven countries) and the likewise non-deductibility of capital losses if the same
requirements are met, iii) the introduction of thin capitalisation rules limiting the
3r For this purpose, all costs bome to hire personnel with training contracts are frrlly deductible (until
2002 only 70 per cent of these were deductible). Furthermore, amounts paid for scholarships and other
fgnds noisubjÀct to the personal incorne tax (IRPEF) are no longer subject to IRAP. The fixed deduction
introduced in 2001 was increased to 7.500 Euros if the tax base is lower than 181.000 Ettros. A new
deduction of 2.000 Euros was introduced for srnall firrns for each employee up to a rnaximttm number of
five.
32 On the contrary, the effects of the special deduction are concentrated, as expected, on small and
unincorporated fims with a large impact on the distribution of firms between positive and negative tax
base. It is irnportant to stress that all reductions linked to labour cost have relative less impact on very
small firms as they usually do not have regular employees.
13 Infonration uruilubl" in our dataset is not detailed enough to model all the proposed changes to the
corporate tax systern. Therefore, while it is not possible to identify companies belonging to the satne
group, the inciàence of capital gains/losses potentially eligible for the exemption/non- dedr-rctibility nrle
òr of interest costs potentiàlly subject to the thin capitalisation rule are computed using data provided by
the Technical Report on the Tax Refonn presented in Parliament'
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amount of paid interest that can be deducted and iv) tlre exemption of 95Yo of dividends
and the abolition of the dividend tax relief.
As regards the corporate tax revenue change, the sinrulations show a slight increase
of about 2 percentage points, while the sectoral effects of the reform are mainly linked
to the differelce between the new statutory tax rate (33%) and the "effective" tax rates
provided by tlie previous DIT regime. Additional results in terms of tax indicators are
presented and discussed in the lollowing section.
4 A more detailed analysis on medium and large firms
In order to perform a more detailed analysis of the effects of the tax refornr discussed in
tl-re previous section, we estimate ex-post implicit tax rates in the two policy scenarios"
tmpiicit rates are computed as tlre .uiio b.t*"en taxes actually paid and turnoversa by
running the integrated model on the subset of medium and large corporations (8.279
firrns with more than 99 employees).
Table 3 and Table 4 display the EPITRs, for both the dimensional and the sectoral
breakdown, in the 2001, the baseline and Reform scenarios. These tables also provide
the absolute differences of EPITRs, both for the overall tax burden (IRAP and IRPEG)
and, separately, for IRAP and the corporation tax (IRPEG). In both scenarios, EPITRs
highlight some differences in the tax burden for firms of different size. Although
companies in the subset are subject to the same general tax structure (IRPEG and
IRAP), specific characteristics of the enterprise (production function) and feafures of the
tax law (sectoral, depreciation rates, allowances and tax credits) result in different rates
with firm size and for activity sector of the enterprise: tax rates decrease with the firm
size (Table 3) in both scenarios.
(*) 2001 and Reform scenarios are simulated on the 1998 base year datasel
Source: Authors' estimates
" Fo. ,rore about this choice see Gastaldi and Pazienza (2004), Nicodeme (2002), and Collins and
Shackelford (1995). With EPITRs we look for evidence of discrimination between finns operating in
different sectors or having different size. The drawback of the use of turnover as denorninator is that it
irnplicitly assumes that the true profit margins are constant across sectors and size.
Table 3: EPITRs for different scenarios: size breakdown
EPITRS
(taxes on turnover*100)
Absolute differences
(Reform -2001)
Classes of Firm
employees frequencies
(%)
ui;$il' 
^ 
2oor. Rerornr
Scenario Scenario overall Irap 
CorPoratio
n lax
100-199 58,6
200-249 10,8
2s0-499 18,8
500-1 000 7,3
Above 4l
l 000
4,44 4,18 3,85
4,60 4,31 3,93
4,92 4,6 4,2
4,35 4,08 3,74
1Q§ 3,69 3,34
-0,33 -0,36 0,03
-0,37 -0,3s -0,02
-0,40 -0,38 -0,02
-0,34 -0,38 0,04
-0,35 -0,3 8 0,03
Total 100,00 4,52 4,24 3,gg -0,35 -0,37 0.02
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The tax changes implemented in 2001 by the previous govemment show a reduction of
0,28 percentage points of the avelage implicit tax rate (from 4,52 to 4,24), with a
widespread and generally homogeneous effect across firms of different size.
The full reform proposed by the current government results in a reduction of 0,35
percentage points of the average iniplicit tax rate. This reduction is however mostly due
io the 2Òyo labour cost deduction provided by the IRAP revision (-0,37 percentage
points) and not by the corporation tax reform. We also find that greater benefits are
gained from the IRAP clianges by larger firms due to the fact that labour cost generally
In...ur., with the firm size. Regarding the modelled corporate tax reform, results show
a slight increase of the mean irnplicit rate (0,02 percentage points). This aspect is
discuìsed in more details below. Here we observe that an increase in implicit rates
occurs in alI classes except for companies of the second and third class.
Table 4 shows that the sectoral rates are not homogenous in all scenarios- Highly taxed
firms are those in the 'hotels and restaurants', 'transport and communication', 'real
estate and business activities', 'health ', and 'other service activities' sectors, which
experience implicit rates higher than the mean rate, sectors that, on average, had a small
gain from the DIT sYstem'
As for the effects of the full reform, the simulations show some interesting findings.
Firstly, the reform causes the implicit rate to drop in all sectors except the 'electricity,
gu, ur-rd water supply' sector which records an implicit rate increase of 0,07 per cent
tainly due to the corporation tax reform. This is a somewhat expected finding as,
u".oràing to our simulations, tl-ris^is the sector where (large) firms seem to have been
most favoured by the DIT system.35 On the whole, drops in implicit rates are greater for
companies in the 'commerce' and the 'services' sector.
the eflects of the corporation tax reform for each sector, in short, depend both on
changes in tl-re tax base and on the (uniform) stalutory rate of taxation as compared to
the "effective" rate prevailing in the 2001 scenario where a dual rate system is present"
As a total result, firms in the 'real estate and business activities', 'hotels and
restaurants', 'education', and 'other service activities' sectors would gain from the
corporation tax side of the reform, wl-rile companies in all other sectors would record a
rise in the implicit tax rate.
ri lndeed, this sector had the lowest "effective" statutory rate in 2001 (see Figure 4).
Table 4: EPITRs for difTerent scenarios: sectoral breakdown
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Absolute differences
_(s_elos:2_qQl)
Sector of
Activity
Firnr
frequencies overall Irap CorPoration
9d.". _
Munu/'achùng,
minirtg
Electric:al energy,
gas, sleanl, tttdter
Cottstnrction
ll/holesale and
retail trade
services
Hotel and
restauranl
services
Transport,
storage,
cotntntttticctl ion
SCINrcCS
Reol estale,
and
business services
Edtrcation
services
Llealth and social
services
Other conmutnit-t,
social and
<1 1')
1,22
3,89
8,50
2,31
0,17
4,39
2.,23
4,13
2,19
3,39
2,37
4,77
3,84
2,36
3,62
2.43
3,00
4,07
5,7 6
4.89
5,26
-0,21
0,07
-0,1 8
-0.09
-0,53 0,45
-0,49
-0,99
- 1,65
-0,74
-o,44
0,21
o,24
ois
0.12
0,00
0,3 r
0,11
6,00
4,50
6,32
5,88
4,47
6,09
o,so
|.52
oiz
0,40
2,82
5l5
0,03
-0,08
-0,l3
0,08
-0,046,05
"P9!t9!t9!Xry!!9;
-0,35 olt 0.02
tynonra n"larm scenarios are simulated on the I998 base year dotaset
Source: Authors' estimates
5 Concluding remarks
t1 this paper we have presented a microsimulation model for Italian enterprises to
perlorm tax policy analysis for the business sector. The model discussed here
ieproduces the main indirect taxes (IRAP and social security contributions) on firms and
the corporation tax (IRPEG). As regards data, for tax modelling purposes it is necessary
to movè from single survey data, or single accounts data, to a comprehensive system of
'integrated and systernatised' datasets on enterprises. For this purpose, the model uses a
specific integrated dataset which combines survey data on enterprises and company
accounts for the year 1998, built at ISTAT (ltalian Institute of Statistics) within the
DIECOFIS project. This integrated dataset allows for a complete representation of tl-re
tax rules for Italian corporations and validation results show that the performance of the
integrated model in reproducing the tax system on corporations is good.
25s
ln this paper we run the model to analyse the effects of the fiscal refon.n designed by
the Enabling Law" [n the empirical analysis we considertwo scenarios. The first,200l,
considers the structure of the tax system existing just before the new govemment came
irrto effect. The second scenario, tlre relorm scenario, introduces a dedtrction of 20Yo of
labour costs from tlre IRAP tax base as a first step towards the (future) abolition of this
tax. Moreover, in this scenario, the new corporation tax system moves back to a unifornr
tax rate (33%), as tlre Dual lncome Tax system is abolished, and brings in some clranges
to the determining of the tax base.
Simulations show that the full reforrn reduces the overall (IRAP and IRPEG) ex-
post implicit tax rate from 4,24Yo (2001) to 3,89% (reform scenario), therefore by 0,35
percentage points- One irnportant conclusion we can draw fronr this analysis is that tlie
reduction of rates found in the full reform scenario is mainly due to the large cut in the
IRAP tax base with the abatement of 20o/o of labour costs, while the corporation tax
changes slrould produce a slight increase in the tax burden. Firms operating in sectors
which benefited most frorn the DIT allowance are those that will bear most of tlie
reform cost in terrns of a higher implicit rate (i.e. 'electricity, gas and water supply')"
The simulated reform does not show relevant overall revenue effects.36 However,
gainers and losers can be detected if one looks at the simulation results in terrns of firm
size, localisation, and sector of activity.
16 In evaluating the simLrlation results, we would like to remind that son.re features of the refonn, such as
the consolidated group taxation (which could contribute to reduce the tax burden), cannot be sinlulated.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ISTAT lstituto Nazionale di Statistica (ltalian Institute of Statistics)
MM Microsimulation Models
IRpEG Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Giuridiche (Corporation Tax)
IRAP Imposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive (Regional Tax on Economic
Activity)
EPITR Ex-post Implicit Tax Rates
RTSS Regional Tax and Social Security
PMI Piccole e Medie ImPrese
SCI Sistema dei Conti delle Imprese
ASL\ Archivio Statistico delle Imprese Attive
SME Smalland Mediurn EnterPrises
LE Large Enterprises
SC Social Contributions
IVS Invalidità 
- 
Vecchiaia 
- 
Superstiti
INpS Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (National Institute for Social
Security)
INPDAI Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza per i Dirigenti di Aziende lndustriali
CIG Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria
CIGS Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria
INAIL lstituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro.
DIT Dual Income Tax
VAT Value Added Tax
R. Bardazzi, V. Parisi, M. G. Paztenza 257
References
S" Alrmed, H. lmmervoll, P. Kattuman and H. Sutherland. Multi-country
microsimulation rnodelling of corporate tax policies: prospects and problerns"
Diecofis DeliverableS.l. University of Cambridge, 2003.
R. Bardazzi and M.G Pazienza- The Social Contributions (SC) module: Development
and Results of the IRAP-SC ltalian Model. Diecofis DeliverableS./. University of
Florence, 2003.
R. Bardazzi, F. Gastaldi, M.G. Pazienza. The IRAP module. DIECOFIS Deliverable
i.2. University of Florence" 2002. Available on the website http://istat-it/diecofis.
Centrale dei Bilanci, Archivi dati,2002-
J. Collins a1d D. Shackelford. Corporate Domicile and Average Effective Tax Rates:
The Cases of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
International Tax and Ptrblic Finance. 2:55-83, 1995.
J. Creedy .Tax Model ling, The Economic Record, vol.77 , (237), 189-202,2001 .
J. Creedy" (ed) Microsimulation Modelling of Taxation and the Labour Market. Elgar,
London,2002.
M. Denk and F. Oropallo. Overview of the Issues in Longihrdinal and Cross-Sectional
Multi-Source Databases" DIECOFIS Deliverable l.l. ISTAT, Rome. 2002. Available
on the website http://istat.itldiecofis.
EUROSTAT. Strucrural Business Statistics, National Methodologies, Therne 4,
Industry, Trade and Services, 2001.
F. Gastaldi and M.G Pazienza. Do multinationals Pay less?. in "lnternational
Institutions and Multinational Enterprises" , for "[ntemational Institutions and Global
Governance Series" edited by John-ren CHEN and David SAPSFORD, Eward Elgar.,
2004"
S. Giannini. La nttova tassazione dei redditi di impresa: verso un sistema più fficiente
e competitivo?, mimeo, 2003" Available on the website http://www.capp.unimo.it
A. Gupta and V. Kapur (eds). Microsimulation in Govemment Policy and Forecasting,
Contributions to Economic Analysis.247, North Holland, Amsterdam, 2002.
A. Harding" Microsimulation and Public Policy, Contributions to Economic
Analysis.232, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1996.
M. Keen. The German Tax Reform of 2000. International Tax and Public Finance,Yol.
9 n.5,2002
258 Austrian Joumal of Statistics,Vol. 33 (2004),Nttn'tber I+2,237-259
J. Merz" Microsimulation. A Survey of Principles Developments and Applicatious.
Internalional Journal o.f'Forecasting, vo1.7.77 -104, l99l .
J. Merz. Microsimulation as an lnstrument to Evaluate Economic and Social
Programmes. FFB Disctts,sion Paper n.5. University of Lueneburg, 1993.
J. Merz. Microsimulation" A Survey of Metlrods and Applications for Analysing
Economic and Social Policy" FFB Disctrssion Papet'n.9. University of Lueneburg,
1994.
Ministero delle Finanze. IRAP - lmposta Regionale sulle Attività Produttive, Anno
d'imposta I 998. Rome,2002a.
Ministero delle Finanze. Le Società di Capitali e gli Enti Comrrerciali, Anno d'imposta
1998. Rome,2002b.
L. Mitton, H. Sutherland and M. Weeks. Microsirnulation Modelling .for Policy
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
G. Nicodème. Sector and size effects on effective corporate taxation. Economic popers
n. 153, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs Oecd (2000), Revenue Statistics, Oecd, Paris, 2002-
V. parisi. Modelling the Corporation Tax for ttalian enterprises: methodological aspects
and preliminary results. Quaderni di Ricerca. Dipartimento Economia e Territorio,
Università di Cassino, r1. 7. 2003. Available on the website
http ://www.eco.unicas.itldiPet
H" Sutherland. Static microsimulation models in Europe: a survey. Microsittrulation
Unit Discttssion Paper MU9503, Department of Applied Economics, University of
Cambridge
Author's address:
Univ.-Prof Rossella Bar dazzi
Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato
Università degli Studi di Firenze
Via delle Pandette, 2l
50127 Firenze
Italy
Tel. +39 055 4314492
Fax +39 055 4374919
Elec" Mail : rbardaz@unifi .it
http ://www.uni fi . itldss/economy/b ar dazzi I
259
Univ.-Dr Maria Grazia P azienza
Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato
Università degli Studi di Firenze
Via delle Pandette, 2l
50127 Firenze
Italy
Tel. +39 055 4374516
Fax +39 055 4374919
Elec. Mail: pazienza@unifi .it
lrttp://www.unifi .itidss/economy/p azienzal
Univ. 
- 
Dr. Valentino Parisi
Dipartimento di Economia e Territorio
Università di Cassino
YiaMazzaroppi snc
03043 Cassino (FR)
Italy
Tel. +39 0776299452
Fax +39 0776312035
Elec. Mail : valentino.parisi@eco.unicas.it
http ://www. eco.unicas. itldocente/p ari si
